As usual, I appreciate your contrarian and thoughtful perspective. Always makes me think. That said, I don't think you do justice to the counter-argument against the kind of genetic engineering implied above. Here are 4 examples:
(1) the unavoidable conflict between self-interest and the greater good. If everyone custom-chooses their embr…
As usual, I appreciate your contrarian and thoughtful perspective. Always makes me think. That said, I don't think you do justice to the counter-argument against the kind of genetic engineering implied above. Here are 4 examples:
(1) the unavoidable conflict between self-interest and the greater good. If everyone custom-chooses their embryos, surely there would sometimes be a cost to the greater good. The example of gender in the essay you referred to is a good one. If 90% of parents prefer one gender in some cultures, that doesn't just impact the individual making the choice, it dramatically changes the sexual makeup of society (just as a low-hanging-fruit example). At the very least, we'd want to think about which aspects of genetic selection should be allowed even if they benefit the family making the decision.
(2) That points the probable impact on genetic diversity. If we're all choosing the ideal human based on our limited understanding of human biological health, we could narrow genetic diversity in ways that are disastrous over the long term. Sure, it wouldn't all be bad (and maybe the net impact would be positive), but at least it is worth careful consideration before relying on intentional choice over biological evolutionary processes that made us such a well-adapted species in the first place.
(3) There are huge implications for class disparity assuming this became a standard human practice. I'm sure you're familiar with plenty of good (or bad) sci-fi pointing to the implications of technological innovations that impact human health and well being (I am fond of Gattica for a eugenics example). Cultural practices like this that have profound implications for what it means to be human that would unavoidably differ across SES surely warrant greater care and hesitation relative to more mundane choices (like whether to take prenatal vitamins).
(4) That points to the extent to which custom-designing humans is a sacred topic in the sense that it is deeply (and rightly) moral, with existential implications for human society and well-being that has evolved through extremely different (and slower) processes than human cost-benefit analysis. On the one hand, that could be used to justify your endorsement of eugenics (CBA is the best we've got!). On the other hand, it seems to similarly justify great care about potential risk and harm as a result of over-reliance on CBA for adaptive, complex systems we still understand so poorly (e.g., biological and cultural evolutionary processes, moral intuitions). Those processes have wisdoms of their own that are often (at least plausibly) more reliable than intentional, deliberative reason (and that are part of what makes people fear the scientist that puts all their faith in human reason above other ways of knowing and deciding).
1--I agree with your point of gender selection; it's a case where individual choices might have negative externalities. But I don't see it for other cases. Even if only some people have children who are selected for high intelligence and kindness, say, the world is better off as a result.
2--A world where there are no genes predisposing people towards breast cancer or dementia is a less generally diverse world, but a better one nonetheless.
3--I don't see a principled difference between embryo selection for intelligence and, say, private tutoring—same class differences.
4--There's a big disagreement here! I don't think that our intuitions about what's sacred capture a deep wisdom.
Just a minor point about #4: I don't think our intuitions about the sacred *necessarily* capture a deep wisdom. We can make major mistakes with cost-benefit analysis and we can make major mistakes relying on what our culture/social-history teaches us is moral or sacred. Intuitions about what is sacred involve different ways of knowing with distinct kinds of shortcomings from intentional cost-benefit analysis. But we can agree to disagree on whether there is inherent "intelligence" in moral intuitions (despite it's potential to go awry). Without committing to whether those intuitions come from biological or cultural evolution or from individual implicit learning across the life span, I don't think it makes sense to dismiss them out of hand any more than I think it makes sense to dismiss someone who tells you they recognize a face even though they can't tell you how they recognize it or that a certain berry in their jungle is poisonous even if they can't tell you how they know that.
It's a thoughtful point, and I accept that we can be smart in ways we can't articulate. But I'm unswayed by "wisdom of repugnance" intuitions, which I think is a near-neighbour to (if not identical to) sacredness intuitions. They have a terrible track record. They have been used against homosexuals and inter-racial couples; and, to bring it close to home, have been used to argue against "test-tube babies", i.e., IVF treatment.
Really appreciate you taking the time to engage! You could be right and I know many novel technologies initially seem repugnant that have changed society for the better. Looking back in 50 years, I could imagine your stance might seem like a "no brainer" (with people using it as an example to point out how stupidly resistant to change their parents were). That said, to me it doesn't feel as much like repugnance as like fear of radical change to something that is foundational to what it means to be human. I get your point that we're doing something similar with IVF or just with choosing our partner for that matter, but there are of course degrees of intervention, and the difference between what we currently do and what we could do is tremendous. Not hesitating to choose whatever we can choose to custom design our children--which is how I interpreted your original post--feels to me like something I'd want scientists / policy makers / and individual decision makers to think very slowly and carefully about with respect to unintended / unpredictable consequences. I don't think gender is a unique or extreme example. We would be choosing all sorts of power-asymmetric and identity relevant features, skin color, height, cardiovascular and muscle-building capacity, etc. Concerns about transgender athletes would be trite. Maybe that's okay and unavoidable and we'll just deal with it with some growing pains. But I'm skeptical about going all in without a lot of deliberation with different kinds of experts (including moral philosophers) first. I do take your point, though, and maybe I'm just getting old and curmudgeonly.
I was going to make a similar comment. I have no moral qualms with selecting embryos against "disorders such as cystic fibrosis, muscular dystrophy, and Down syndrome." However, if finer tuned polygenic screening became possible, I would think that we would need to think carefully about the practical, social choice implications (@casinocognition's #2) related genetic diversity and potential unintended consequences. So, I don't have principled objections to embryo selection, but I might have consequential concerns about it.
Very good observations. I’d only disagree with the third point, since humans already differ across SES. Granted, genetic engineering would make such differences even more pronounced—at least at the beginning, when only the affluent would have access to it. But still, it would just be a matter of degree and not a fundamental change. As R. Herrnstein wrote in IQ in the Meritocracy: “In Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World, it was malevolent or misguided science that created the “alphas,” “gammas,” and the other distinct types of people. But nature itself is more likely to do the job or something similar”.
Thanks for your comment. The point you refer to wasn't meant to imply that the policy would promote income inequality (if that's what you meant), but rather that the enduring fact of income inequality is particularly relevant for how we might evaluate a policy that lets parents choose their children's genotype. To the extent wealth might end up playing a major role in the kind of "genetically bespoke children" parents can choose, to me it adds a troubling layer to issues of income inequality.
On (1), let's say genetic selection favored one sex over the other. Within a space of the few years necessary to observe the population pyramid disparity, parents could see the problem. Members of the favored sex are destined to have trouble finding a partner. This presumably concerns them, especially if they want grandkids. It should prompt a rebalancing of selection.
Could be. The evidence of infanticide promoting culture-specific sex preferences (usually male as far as I've seen) suggests this process may not occur as readily as you imagine (unless by "few years" you have in mind thousands of years, in which case I'm more agnostic). That's putting aside both utilitarian and deontological moral preferences that may be associated with human flourishing and yet conflict with the evolutionary "goal" of differential reproductive success.
As usual, I appreciate your contrarian and thoughtful perspective. Always makes me think. That said, I don't think you do justice to the counter-argument against the kind of genetic engineering implied above. Here are 4 examples:
(1) the unavoidable conflict between self-interest and the greater good. If everyone custom-chooses their embryos, surely there would sometimes be a cost to the greater good. The example of gender in the essay you referred to is a good one. If 90% of parents prefer one gender in some cultures, that doesn't just impact the individual making the choice, it dramatically changes the sexual makeup of society (just as a low-hanging-fruit example). At the very least, we'd want to think about which aspects of genetic selection should be allowed even if they benefit the family making the decision.
(2) That points the probable impact on genetic diversity. If we're all choosing the ideal human based on our limited understanding of human biological health, we could narrow genetic diversity in ways that are disastrous over the long term. Sure, it wouldn't all be bad (and maybe the net impact would be positive), but at least it is worth careful consideration before relying on intentional choice over biological evolutionary processes that made us such a well-adapted species in the first place.
(3) There are huge implications for class disparity assuming this became a standard human practice. I'm sure you're familiar with plenty of good (or bad) sci-fi pointing to the implications of technological innovations that impact human health and well being (I am fond of Gattica for a eugenics example). Cultural practices like this that have profound implications for what it means to be human that would unavoidably differ across SES surely warrant greater care and hesitation relative to more mundane choices (like whether to take prenatal vitamins).
(4) That points to the extent to which custom-designing humans is a sacred topic in the sense that it is deeply (and rightly) moral, with existential implications for human society and well-being that has evolved through extremely different (and slower) processes than human cost-benefit analysis. On the one hand, that could be used to justify your endorsement of eugenics (CBA is the best we've got!). On the other hand, it seems to similarly justify great care about potential risk and harm as a result of over-reliance on CBA for adaptive, complex systems we still understand so poorly (e.g., biological and cultural evolutionary processes, moral intuitions). Those processes have wisdoms of their own that are often (at least plausibly) more reliable than intentional, deliberative reason (and that are part of what makes people fear the scientist that puts all their faith in human reason above other ways of knowing and deciding).
Interesting remarks!
1--I agree with your point of gender selection; it's a case where individual choices might have negative externalities. But I don't see it for other cases. Even if only some people have children who are selected for high intelligence and kindness, say, the world is better off as a result.
2--A world where there are no genes predisposing people towards breast cancer or dementia is a less generally diverse world, but a better one nonetheless.
3--I don't see a principled difference between embryo selection for intelligence and, say, private tutoring—same class differences.
4--There's a big disagreement here! I don't think that our intuitions about what's sacred capture a deep wisdom.
Just a minor point about #4: I don't think our intuitions about the sacred *necessarily* capture a deep wisdom. We can make major mistakes with cost-benefit analysis and we can make major mistakes relying on what our culture/social-history teaches us is moral or sacred. Intuitions about what is sacred involve different ways of knowing with distinct kinds of shortcomings from intentional cost-benefit analysis. But we can agree to disagree on whether there is inherent "intelligence" in moral intuitions (despite it's potential to go awry). Without committing to whether those intuitions come from biological or cultural evolution or from individual implicit learning across the life span, I don't think it makes sense to dismiss them out of hand any more than I think it makes sense to dismiss someone who tells you they recognize a face even though they can't tell you how they recognize it or that a certain berry in their jungle is poisonous even if they can't tell you how they know that.
It's a thoughtful point, and I accept that we can be smart in ways we can't articulate. But I'm unswayed by "wisdom of repugnance" intuitions, which I think is a near-neighbour to (if not identical to) sacredness intuitions. They have a terrible track record. They have been used against homosexuals and inter-racial couples; and, to bring it close to home, have been used to argue against "test-tube babies", i.e., IVF treatment.
Really appreciate you taking the time to engage! You could be right and I know many novel technologies initially seem repugnant that have changed society for the better. Looking back in 50 years, I could imagine your stance might seem like a "no brainer" (with people using it as an example to point out how stupidly resistant to change their parents were). That said, to me it doesn't feel as much like repugnance as like fear of radical change to something that is foundational to what it means to be human. I get your point that we're doing something similar with IVF or just with choosing our partner for that matter, but there are of course degrees of intervention, and the difference between what we currently do and what we could do is tremendous. Not hesitating to choose whatever we can choose to custom design our children--which is how I interpreted your original post--feels to me like something I'd want scientists / policy makers / and individual decision makers to think very slowly and carefully about with respect to unintended / unpredictable consequences. I don't think gender is a unique or extreme example. We would be choosing all sorts of power-asymmetric and identity relevant features, skin color, height, cardiovascular and muscle-building capacity, etc. Concerns about transgender athletes would be trite. Maybe that's okay and unavoidable and we'll just deal with it with some growing pains. But I'm skeptical about going all in without a lot of deliberation with different kinds of experts (including moral philosophers) first. I do take your point, though, and maybe I'm just getting old and curmudgeonly.
I was going to make a similar comment. I have no moral qualms with selecting embryos against "disorders such as cystic fibrosis, muscular dystrophy, and Down syndrome." However, if finer tuned polygenic screening became possible, I would think that we would need to think carefully about the practical, social choice implications (@casinocognition's #2) related genetic diversity and potential unintended consequences. So, I don't have principled objections to embryo selection, but I might have consequential concerns about it.
Very good observations. I’d only disagree with the third point, since humans already differ across SES. Granted, genetic engineering would make such differences even more pronounced—at least at the beginning, when only the affluent would have access to it. But still, it would just be a matter of degree and not a fundamental change. As R. Herrnstein wrote in IQ in the Meritocracy: “In Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World, it was malevolent or misguided science that created the “alphas,” “gammas,” and the other distinct types of people. But nature itself is more likely to do the job or something similar”.
Thanks for your comment. The point you refer to wasn't meant to imply that the policy would promote income inequality (if that's what you meant), but rather that the enduring fact of income inequality is particularly relevant for how we might evaluate a policy that lets parents choose their children's genotype. To the extent wealth might end up playing a major role in the kind of "genetically bespoke children" parents can choose, to me it adds a troubling layer to issues of income inequality.
On (1), let's say genetic selection favored one sex over the other. Within a space of the few years necessary to observe the population pyramid disparity, parents could see the problem. Members of the favored sex are destined to have trouble finding a partner. This presumably concerns them, especially if they want grandkids. It should prompt a rebalancing of selection.
Could be. The evidence of infanticide promoting culture-specific sex preferences (usually male as far as I've seen) suggests this process may not occur as readily as you imagine (unless by "few years" you have in mind thousands of years, in which case I'm more agnostic). That's putting aside both utilitarian and deontological moral preferences that may be associated with human flourishing and yet conflict with the evolutionary "goal" of differential reproductive success.