"You might think that the solution here is to try hard not to fall prey to our implicit biases. Perhaps learning about and thinking about our biases can help us overcome them, just through force of will. Unfortunately, the evidence suggests otherwise. We are good at self-justification. We make choices that are shaped by implicit bias and convince ourselves that we are fair and impartial."
I also think this is wrong and you can rationally override your implicit bias!
Hi Paul. I reject the reasonableness of defining an "association" as a bias. Indeed, defining "bias" is pretty tricky. Sometimes, it is mere preference. Other times it is deviation from normative stat model. Yet other times it, it is some sort of systematic error. Yet other times, it is two people judging the same stimuli differently. Associations are none of these things. Associations may predict some of these things some of the time, but: 1. That is an empirical question each time; 2. If A (associations) predict B (preferences, behavior, judgments) then A and B must be different things. Put differently, I associate ham with cheese. To refer to this as any sort of bias (not that you did, but it is an association which you did state is a bias) strikes me as unjustified. Then you get the nasty downstream effects, where by A is amply demonstrated (association) and then simply presumed to constitute some sort of nasty bias (e.g., racial prejudice or stereotypes). Very motte (there is an association!) and bailey (look how racist they all are!).
It then goes downhill from there. Even when associations predict some outcome, it does not necessarily constitute the bailey. Say IAT scores predict discrim, r=.2 or so. This can occur because high racism iat scores correspond to racist behavior, 0 corresponds to egalitarian behavior and negative scores to anti-White behavior. Or it can occur because high "racism" IAT scores correspond to egalitarian behavior and ones near zero to anti-White behavior. For a real example, see Blanton et al 2009 JAP.
I'm having a tough time connecting your comments with my post. I say that implicit biases are associations we have with groups, often with some sort of positive or negative feelings. So, no, you're wrong -- for me, the association between ham and cheese isn't a bias.
I don't say or imply that biases are nasty or racist (though I think some are). I mean, I have a section called "Does implicit bias mean that we are all, in general, racist?" and then write "My answer is: No". Hard to be more clear than that. And since I argue _against_ the predictive power of IATs and say that they don't predict discrimination, I don't get the point of your last paragraph at all.
I'm very interested in your views on this topic, and would love your feedback, but I worry that you wrote your comment without actually reading my post.
I read the whole thing carefully, Paul. I was responding to this, which strikes me as the definitional glue holding together much of the post. You wrote
"What are implicit biases?"
"They are the associations that we have with human groups, often with some sort of positive or negative feelings. Some examples are associating elderly people with incompetence, men with violence, women with nurturance, and Jews with finance."
So you answer to the q, "What are implicit biases" is associations with human groups. My comment addresses that head-on and says, "not so fast."
You then continue:
"These studies have been done with millions of people and have found that people have negative associations on the basis of race, age, sexual orientation, body weight, disability, and other factors."
Well, maybe. They show differently reaction times to various double paired-then-inverted-double-pairs of concepts. But the entire point of my comment (and, really Blanton et al's paper) is that 0 does not necessarily correspond to egalitarian beliefs, judgments or behaviors. Indeed, they found that IAT scores much higher than 0 (typically interpreted as "negative associations") correspond to egalitarian-ness. If scores much higher than 0 typically or even intermittently correspond to egalitarian-ness, then it is not justified to interpret the many studies showing IAT>0 as "negative associations" in any meaningful way with respect to any sort of bias.
I decided to comment because, though I do think you did a good job here capturing some of the limitations and interpretive problems with IAT research, the post understates known limitations to the IAT that undercut justifications for interpreting findings as bias (as defined in any of the ways listed in my first comment).
Hi Lee. You say that IAT scores don't reliably connect how "egalitarian" people are. Are you sure we disagree about this? Maybe we're using the word in different ways, but I certainly wouldn't say that the IAT measures how egalitarian we are!
But, yes, I do think the IAT can detect (roughly) "negative associations". If you are quicker to connect terms like "bad" to the elderly (vs. positive terms like "good"), say, this suggests that we have a negative association with elderly people. I guess we disagree about this?
It is a reaction time difference, not a bias. Whether any particular score, including a faster response to elderly-bad/young-good than to elderly-good/young-bad reflects a "negative association" in any sense other than "speed-of-reaction-time" is precisely what is at issue. And yes, I am saying that a faster response on the iat to e-b/y-g than to e-g/y-b does not necessarily mean "negative association" in any conventional meaning of the word "negative."
Relatedly, you did define implicit bias as an association involving human groups, so that would exclude my ham and cheese example (though, cognitively, I do not see why it should, but its your definition, so I'll go with it). I associate the French with wine, pro baseball players with athleticism, and rural dwellers in the U.S. with Trump support. I do not see how any of these would constitute bias for any conventional meaning of the term bias. If one agrees that some associations are not bias, then bias cannot be defined as associations of concepts with human groups. It remains possible that some associations of concepts with human groups are some sort of bias, but one would then need to define bias as something other than mere associations.
Phenomenal ending and advice there about making friends. So true.
'Implicit' biases are just stereotypes, perhaps ones we aren't so cognizant of. Stereotypes serve our self-interest - they are generalizations we humans make for pragmatic reasons. We can disagree which stereotypes are stronger or weaker (it is a question of probability).
Making friends puts a human face to an identity group*, which should theoretically break or at least nuance one's stereotype for that group. My fear is that one can still hold prejudiced views even if one 'has black friends' or a 'gay brother', etc. Nonetheless, in my experience, critical reflection greatly undermines the convincingness of such ill-refined views.
Then there is the separate debate of the morality of said stereotypes/biases. Like you said, it gets complicated if we consider that people may prefer terms for differing reasons. E.g., 'young' over 'elderly' due to preference for 'youthful traits' and corresponding health advantages (notice the self-interest). Likewise for obesity. Baseball card buyers may also be using skin colour as an indicator of a seller's economic status (the same phenomenon when a business increases their prices according to the perceived budget/wealth of the client).
*That is, if you view people through identity groups, a view I would guess is universal, although identities whose strengths vary significantly across different cultures (e.g., Dave may just see Sarah as a fellow citizen regardless of her religion, language, heritage, etc.). That said, visible distinguishers are harder to ignore for the human brain. From my own experience, I feel as though the contemporary push to prioritize race to identify others has actually made me feel more awkward around those I never felt awkward around before. My brain categorizes them as another 'race', as opposed to just another human, friend, or stranger. That can't be a good thing...(?)
Hello Professor. Thank you for this great article. Would you be able to link to some meta analysis or otherwise for the evidence you quote below? Cheers!
"Perhaps learning about and thinking about our biases can help us overcome them, just through force of will. Unfortunately, the evidence suggests otherwise. We are good at self-justification. We make choices that are shaped by implicit bias and convince ourselves that we are fair and impartial."
"You might think that the solution here is to try hard not to fall prey to our implicit biases. Perhaps learning about and thinking about our biases can help us overcome them, just through force of will. Unfortunately, the evidence suggests otherwise. We are good at self-justification. We make choices that are shaped by implicit bias and convince ourselves that we are fair and impartial."
I also think this is wrong and you can rationally override your implicit bias!
Fascinating, thank you
Hi Paul. I reject the reasonableness of defining an "association" as a bias. Indeed, defining "bias" is pretty tricky. Sometimes, it is mere preference. Other times it is deviation from normative stat model. Yet other times it, it is some sort of systematic error. Yet other times, it is two people judging the same stimuli differently. Associations are none of these things. Associations may predict some of these things some of the time, but: 1. That is an empirical question each time; 2. If A (associations) predict B (preferences, behavior, judgments) then A and B must be different things. Put differently, I associate ham with cheese. To refer to this as any sort of bias (not that you did, but it is an association which you did state is a bias) strikes me as unjustified. Then you get the nasty downstream effects, where by A is amply demonstrated (association) and then simply presumed to constitute some sort of nasty bias (e.g., racial prejudice or stereotypes). Very motte (there is an association!) and bailey (look how racist they all are!).
It then goes downhill from there. Even when associations predict some outcome, it does not necessarily constitute the bailey. Say IAT scores predict discrim, r=.2 or so. This can occur because high racism iat scores correspond to racist behavior, 0 corresponds to egalitarian behavior and negative scores to anti-White behavior. Or it can occur because high "racism" IAT scores correspond to egalitarian behavior and ones near zero to anti-White behavior. For a real example, see Blanton et al 2009 JAP.
HI, Lee.
I'm having a tough time connecting your comments with my post. I say that implicit biases are associations we have with groups, often with some sort of positive or negative feelings. So, no, you're wrong -- for me, the association between ham and cheese isn't a bias.
I don't say or imply that biases are nasty or racist (though I think some are). I mean, I have a section called "Does implicit bias mean that we are all, in general, racist?" and then write "My answer is: No". Hard to be more clear than that. And since I argue _against_ the predictive power of IATs and say that they don't predict discrimination, I don't get the point of your last paragraph at all.
I'm very interested in your views on this topic, and would love your feedback, but I worry that you wrote your comment without actually reading my post.
I read the whole thing carefully, Paul. I was responding to this, which strikes me as the definitional glue holding together much of the post. You wrote
"What are implicit biases?"
"They are the associations that we have with human groups, often with some sort of positive or negative feelings. Some examples are associating elderly people with incompetence, men with violence, women with nurturance, and Jews with finance."
So you answer to the q, "What are implicit biases" is associations with human groups. My comment addresses that head-on and says, "not so fast."
You then continue:
"These studies have been done with millions of people and have found that people have negative associations on the basis of race, age, sexual orientation, body weight, disability, and other factors."
Well, maybe. They show differently reaction times to various double paired-then-inverted-double-pairs of concepts. But the entire point of my comment (and, really Blanton et al's paper) is that 0 does not necessarily correspond to egalitarian beliefs, judgments or behaviors. Indeed, they found that IAT scores much higher than 0 (typically interpreted as "negative associations") correspond to egalitarian-ness. If scores much higher than 0 typically or even intermittently correspond to egalitarian-ness, then it is not justified to interpret the many studies showing IAT>0 as "negative associations" in any meaningful way with respect to any sort of bias.
I decided to comment because, though I do think you did a good job here capturing some of the limitations and interpretive problems with IAT research, the post understates known limitations to the IAT that undercut justifications for interpreting findings as bias (as defined in any of the ways listed in my first comment).
Hi Lee. You say that IAT scores don't reliably connect how "egalitarian" people are. Are you sure we disagree about this? Maybe we're using the word in different ways, but I certainly wouldn't say that the IAT measures how egalitarian we are!
But, yes, I do think the IAT can detect (roughly) "negative associations". If you are quicker to connect terms like "bad" to the elderly (vs. positive terms like "good"), say, this suggests that we have a negative association with elderly people. I guess we disagree about this?
It is a reaction time difference, not a bias. Whether any particular score, including a faster response to elderly-bad/young-good than to elderly-good/young-bad reflects a "negative association" in any sense other than "speed-of-reaction-time" is precisely what is at issue. And yes, I am saying that a faster response on the iat to e-b/y-g than to e-g/y-b does not necessarily mean "negative association" in any conventional meaning of the word "negative."
Relatedly, you did define implicit bias as an association involving human groups, so that would exclude my ham and cheese example (though, cognitively, I do not see why it should, but its your definition, so I'll go with it). I associate the French with wine, pro baseball players with athleticism, and rural dwellers in the U.S. with Trump support. I do not see how any of these would constitute bias for any conventional meaning of the term bias. If one agrees that some associations are not bias, then bias cannot be defined as associations of concepts with human groups. It remains possible that some associations of concepts with human groups are some sort of bias, but one would then need to define bias as something other than mere associations.
Phenomenal ending and advice there about making friends. So true.
'Implicit' biases are just stereotypes, perhaps ones we aren't so cognizant of. Stereotypes serve our self-interest - they are generalizations we humans make for pragmatic reasons. We can disagree which stereotypes are stronger or weaker (it is a question of probability).
Making friends puts a human face to an identity group*, which should theoretically break or at least nuance one's stereotype for that group. My fear is that one can still hold prejudiced views even if one 'has black friends' or a 'gay brother', etc. Nonetheless, in my experience, critical reflection greatly undermines the convincingness of such ill-refined views.
Then there is the separate debate of the morality of said stereotypes/biases. Like you said, it gets complicated if we consider that people may prefer terms for differing reasons. E.g., 'young' over 'elderly' due to preference for 'youthful traits' and corresponding health advantages (notice the self-interest). Likewise for obesity. Baseball card buyers may also be using skin colour as an indicator of a seller's economic status (the same phenomenon when a business increases their prices according to the perceived budget/wealth of the client).
*That is, if you view people through identity groups, a view I would guess is universal, although identities whose strengths vary significantly across different cultures (e.g., Dave may just see Sarah as a fellow citizen regardless of her religion, language, heritage, etc.). That said, visible distinguishers are harder to ignore for the human brain. From my own experience, I feel as though the contemporary push to prioritize race to identify others has actually made me feel more awkward around those I never felt awkward around before. My brain categorizes them as another 'race', as opposed to just another human, friend, or stranger. That can't be a good thing...(?)
Hello Professor. Thank you for this great article. Would you be able to link to some meta analysis or otherwise for the evidence you quote below? Cheers!
"Perhaps learning about and thinking about our biases can help us overcome them, just through force of will. Unfortunately, the evidence suggests otherwise. We are good at self-justification. We make choices that are shaped by implicit bias and convince ourselves that we are fair and impartial."