I agree that the distinction only arises when you deal with high-level categories. If all you're interested in is the movement of elementary particles, maybe it all goes away. But it seems perfectly coherently at the higher level. I know the rules and you don't because I've had the experience that…
I agree that the distinction only arises when you deal with high-level categories. If all you're interested in is the movement of elementary particles, maybe it all goes away. But it seems perfectly coherently at the higher level. I know the rules and you don't because I've had the experience that let me learn them; I know the rules and my dog doesn't because it wasn't born with the requisite learning mechanisms. This explanation seems true to me (and to you?) and assumes a distinction between learning and innate stuff.
To put it another way, you might be saying that the distinction between actual causes and background conditions is always dependent on our interests. If so, I'm tempted to agree but then your point also holds for other sciences--it was a meteor that killed the dinosaurs, not a zillion other factors; measles give you spots not a zillion other factors -- and since such claims are perfectly respectable, 'm not worried that your point applies to psychology as well.
But I might be totally missing your point; if so sorry, and please clarify if you have the time.
Thanks for the reply. Let me try to think about this more clearly.
I agree with you that there is an important distinction between traits that are and are not innate. I have appealed to this distinction in my own work. Where I disagree with you is that the right way to unpack this distinction is in terms of whether biological factors or the environment is "the cause" as opposed to the background condition, since that classification just hangs on our interests.
That was what my pair of examples was supposed to show. The effect is the same (you knowing the rules of pickleball) but *implicit* contrasts affect what we think of as "the cause." So, if innate means <caused by biology> then the category isn't objective; what's innate shifts with our interests.
A better way to unpack the distinction between innate and non-innate might be in terms of *what kinds of processes* are at play in generating a given trait. (Either way, biology and environment will be causes.)
First pass: innate traits are the result of "growth," non-innate traits the result of "learning" (as hinted when you discussed Chomsky). You have to conceive of "learning" in a very capacious way though, as something like *responding to information*, such that even some biological, non-mental processes count as learning.
Sorry, Victor, but I'm not sure I follow.
I agree that the distinction only arises when you deal with high-level categories. If all you're interested in is the movement of elementary particles, maybe it all goes away. But it seems perfectly coherently at the higher level. I know the rules and you don't because I've had the experience that let me learn them; I know the rules and my dog doesn't because it wasn't born with the requisite learning mechanisms. This explanation seems true to me (and to you?) and assumes a distinction between learning and innate stuff.
To put it another way, you might be saying that the distinction between actual causes and background conditions is always dependent on our interests. If so, I'm tempted to agree but then your point also holds for other sciences--it was a meteor that killed the dinosaurs, not a zillion other factors; measles give you spots not a zillion other factors -- and since such claims are perfectly respectable, 'm not worried that your point applies to psychology as well.
But I might be totally missing your point; if so sorry, and please clarify if you have the time.
Thanks for the reply. Let me try to think about this more clearly.
I agree with you that there is an important distinction between traits that are and are not innate. I have appealed to this distinction in my own work. Where I disagree with you is that the right way to unpack this distinction is in terms of whether biological factors or the environment is "the cause" as opposed to the background condition, since that classification just hangs on our interests.
That was what my pair of examples was supposed to show. The effect is the same (you knowing the rules of pickleball) but *implicit* contrasts affect what we think of as "the cause." So, if innate means <caused by biology> then the category isn't objective; what's innate shifts with our interests.
A better way to unpack the distinction between innate and non-innate might be in terms of *what kinds of processes* are at play in generating a given trait. (Either way, biology and environment will be causes.)
First pass: innate traits are the result of "growth," non-innate traits the result of "learning" (as hinted when you discussed Chomsky). You have to conceive of "learning" in a very capacious way though, as something like *responding to information*, such that even some biological, non-mental processes count as learning.